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Vico, Llewellyn and the Task of Legal Education*
Francis J. Mootz III
William S. Boyd Professor of Law
William S. Boyd School of Law
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Jay.Mootz@unlv.edu

How does legal education fail students? This question invites a book rather than an
essay, but I intend to focus on a particular deficiency as part of this mini-symposium. I agree
with Max that legal education is too text-bound, and with Randy that it approaches texts in
a manner that is far too circumscribed. In my contribution to the conversation I want to argue
that legal education suppresses law’s rhetorical roots, and that this failure is both textual and
non-textual in nature. I draw inspiration from an oration delivered by Giambattista Vico
exactly three hundred years ago, and from an aside in a short but provocative essay published
by Karl Llewellyn exactly seventy-five years ago. In the wake of the recent Carnegie Report
on the legal profession and legal education, the time is ripe to renew the unheeded calls by
Vico and Llewellyn for a legal education that is rhetorical in nature.
1.

Law’s Neglect of Rhetoric

Law is a specialized rhetorical discourse, but lawyers tend not to understand the full
depth of this reality. Too many lawyers regard law as a system of “given” narratives
operating within a rigid semiotic economy, failing to recognize that law is a dynamic system
that constantly is under construction. This failure is explained partly by their desire for law
to be real, objective and enduring. An unfortunate result of this desire is that lawyers too
readily resign themselves to making only technical interventions and engaging in
instrumentalist strategies, parroting bits of the dominant narratives in response to certain
discrete problems. This approach often is sufficient to permit them to achieve their clients’
objectives, and so these instrumental efforts pay very well. Well-paid lawyers tend not to ask
too many questions. Consequently, the rhetorical dimension of law is, at best, misunderstood by lawyers who equate it with showmanship and stylistic flourish; more likely
it is wholly ignored.

*

This essay is drawn from a talk first presented at the International Conference on the Future of Legal
Education at Georgia State University School of Law on February 20-23, 2008. In its current form, the essay was
presented at the 12 th Annual Conference of the Association for the Study of Law, Culture and the Humanities at Suffolk
University Law School on April 3-4, 2009. I thank the audiences and my fellow panelists at both events – Max Del Mar,
Randy Gordon, and Chuck Marvin – for their stimulating conversation.
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Why do lawyers understand their practice in such a shallow manner, and how can
legal education correct this inadequacy? I already have suggested an initial, general answer
to this question. Most lawyers would regard something as exotic as rhetorical theory to have
no relevance to the real world of lawyering. And, if it can’t help to win a case or to succeed
in a negotiation, lawyers will see little point in learning about what appears to be solely an
academic dalliance.
There are two general responses to this anti-intellectualism. First, one might argue
that lawyers will become better lawyers if they understand rhetoric, even if there is no
rhetorical methodology that can be studied, memorized and then applied in legal practice.
Second, one might claim that the lawyer’s avowed instrumentalism is the very problem to be
addressed, and then suggest that the insights of rhetorical theory can assist us in
understanding why lawyers suffer from this malady. The first response tends to affirm the
instrumental and reductivist approach to law, which is the principal problem; therefore, it
threatens to undermine the possibility for the second response. This article principally
addresses the second point, but also suggests that this critical approach indirectly sheds light
on how we might improve legal education in order to educate more effective lawyers, once
we have broadened our notion of effectiveness beyond instrumentalism.
2.

Vico’s Ingenious Method of Rhetorical Education

I begin by recalling Vico’s most famous oration delivered at the commencement of
the academic year at the University of Naples in 1708 and published the following year. The
scope of On the Study Methods of Our Time 1 is breathtaking: with the Cartesian “critical
method” rapidly gaining ascendence in intellectual circles, Vico argued on behalf of the
humanistic tradition in a manner that is neither ill-informed nor atavistic. He fully
appreciated the power of the Cartesian method, but he also anticipated that its power would
prove to be overbearing. He conceded that we must embrace the new rationalism, but that
we should do so only without sacrificing ancient wisdom.2 Vico’s lament is not that we have
abandoned a glorious intellectual past, but that we have failed to fulfill the intellectual
promise of our future. It is no overstatement to say that Vico foresaw at the dawn of the
1

G IAM BATTISTA V ICO , O N THE S TU D Y M ETH O D S
1990) (1709) [hereinafter S TU D Y M ETH O DS ].

OF

O UR T IM E (Elio Gianturco trans., Cornell Univ. Press

2

As described by Elio Ginaturco, Vico
sets the seal of a philosophical conclusion upon the Quarrel of the Ancients and the Moderns. Vico
draws, so to speak, the final balance-sheet of the great controversy; not only that, but transposes it to
a ground where the problem posited can receive a solution. He is a reconciler of the two factions; he
lifts their debate to a high philosophical plane, he rises to the concept of a modern culture harmonizing
the scientific with the humanistic aspects of education.
Elio Ginaturco, Translator’s Introduction to S TU D Y M ETH O DS , supra note 1, at xxiii-xxiv.
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modern rationalist era that lawyers would lose their ingenuity and become technocrats who
are managed by legal narratives instead of them being equipped to exercise their rhetorical
roles as managers of meaning.
Vico begins his oration with a reminder that all human knowledge is partial and
fallible, and therefore that we should always be ready to assess our beliefs and correct them.
However, he exhorts his audience to recognize that Cartesian radical doubt undermines not
only false beliefs that should be discarded but also beliefs grounded in the probable, without
which we could not live.3 The critical method undermines the cultivation of common sense,
which subtends both practical judgment and eloquence, thereby restricting knowledge to an
arid and abstract intellectualism.4 It is important to stress that Vico does not seek to abandon
the Cartesian method in order to return to ancient rhetoric. Instead, he counsels a prudent
understanding of the role that each can play: “a severely intellectualistic criticism enables us
to achieve truth, while ars topica makes us eloquent. . . . Each procedure, then has its defects.
The specialists in topics fall in with falsehood; the philosophical critics disdain any traffic
with probability.” 5
Vico argues that relentless criticism leaves no room for the rhetorical arts, but it is
only in rhetorical engagement that we can deal with questions that admit of no definitive
answer. The law purports to seek certainty, but when this goal is understood to mean “truth”
in the sense of the Cartesian method it become a debilitating straitjacket for legal practice.
Nature and life are full of incertitude; the foremost, indeed, the only aim of our
[rhetorical] “arts” is to assure us that we have acted rightly. . . . Those who
know all the loci, i.e., the lines of argument to be used, are able (by an
operation not unlike reading the printed characters on a page) to grasp
extemporaneously the elements of persuasion inherent in any question or case.
. . . In pressing, urgent affairs, which do not admit of delay or postponement,
as most frequently occurs in our law courts . . . it is the orator’s business to
give immediate assistance . . . Our experts in philosophical criticism, instead,
whenever they are confronted with some dubious point, are wont to say: “Give
me some time to think it over!” 6

3

Indeed, if a person were to try to live life by utilizing only Cartesian reasoning she would be incapable of
action and most likely would be regarded as having a serious mental disturbance.
4

S TU D Y M ETH O DS , supra note 1, at 13.

5

Id. at 17, 19.

6

Id. at 15.
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Rhetoric is unavoidable just because life is uncertain. The Cartesian philosopher vainly
seeks to determine the truth of the matter, and therefore is impotent when faced with a choice
between two proposed courses of action that are equally valid from a logical perspective. In
contrast, one who is capable of determining the relevant arguments “for and against” the
proposed action on the basis of the probabilities of the given circumstances, and is then able
to persuade others as to the best approach, exhibits a wisdom that is far superior for this task
than the more limited scope of definitive truth.
Vico provocatively compares the ability to “grasp extemporaneously” the lines of
argument to “reading the printed characters on a page.” We speak colloquially about
“reading a situation,” but Vico is suggesting that we take this metaphor to a deeper level.
The abstract characters that form a written language are capable of generating an infinite
number of expressions as speakers combine them in new and inventive ways over time.
Reading social situations is not an unmediated perceptual facility; rather, it is an art that
develops over time as one develops familiarity with the commonplaces that can be deployed
in creative ways. An education in eloquence is an education in arraying lines of argument
inventively to respond to the situation, and this art rests on ingenuity in “seeing” which
arguments best match the situation. The sage understands that this capacity is distinct from
philosophical criticism, and is not so foolish as to “apply to the prudent conduct of life the
abstract criterion of reasoning that obtains in the domain of science.” 7
Vico insists that the art of making arguments through an inventive use of
commonplaces “is by nature prior to the judgment of their validity,” and so the art of rhetoric
should be granted priority rather than being suppressed.8 First, one must locate the means
of persuasion within a given situation before it is even possible to test the reasoning with
philosophical criticism. Even more important, not all prudential decisions can or should be
subjected to second-guessing by the philosopher. Many of life’s issues simply are not
amenable to philosophical analysis in the Cartesian tradition; instead, they call for mature
judgment that Vico identifies with the ancient rhetorical tradition. The ingenuity of finding
similarities among seemingly different factors, the imaginative capacity to create a new
understanding of reality, and the prudence to choose appropriately when the matter is not
subject to calculation: these are the humanistic capabilities that Vico championed, despite
the vigorous Cartesian criticism that their uncertain basis introduces the possibility of error.
The sage must be committed to truth, but also ready to act when the frailties of the human
condition preclude an analysis that demonstrates the truth of the matter. The sage, “through
all the obliquities and uncertainties of human actions and events, keeps his eye steadily

7

Id. at 35.

8

Id. at 14.
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focused on eternal truth, manages to follow a roundabout way whenever he cannot travel in
a straight line, and makes decisions, in the field of action, which, in the course of time, prove
to be as profitable as the nature of things permit.” 9
These considerations lead directly to Vico’s recommendations for organizing
education. Building on the oration he had delivered in the previous year,10 Vico insists that
students must first develop their rhetorical skills before being introduced to philosophical
criticism. Vico fears that the student might lose forever her capacity for ingenuity,
imagination and eloquence if she is exposed to the abstract intellectualism of the Cartesian
method without first cultivating the humanistic arts. Vico brings his thesis to bear in very
concrete ways in a detailed discussion of law and legal education. He recounts the
emergence of law as a distinct discipline. The Greeks regarded law as a site of the activity
of conjoining philosophy and oratorical skills.11 Similarly, the Romans maintained written
laws strictly, but utilized legal fictions that were generated by the orator to avoid injustice.12
In modern times, though, the law has expanded beyond the stark written text and enveloped
within itself the moderating force of equity as a matter of interpretation rather than
eloquence.13
The law now claims the mantel of justice, which represents both a positive
development and a loss: although the law has become directly equitable, we have now lost
the connection between law and eloquence, understood as wisdom speaking appropriately
to the given situation. Vico regards it as a clear advantage that “the professions of legal
expert and orator are, in our age, joined in the same person,” 14 but as justice was absorbed
into law it became too easy for private parties to manipulate the levers of legal authority for
their own gain without any check or limit. It was the decay of eloquence in favor of the
pursuit of self-interest, Vico emphasizes, that sealed Rome’s fate.15 The law has now
become a fully self-sufficient discourse that is susceptible to technical manipulation because

9

Id.

10

G IAM BATTISTA V ICO , On the Proper Order of Studies, in O N H U M AN ISTIC E D U CATIO N 125-40 (S IX
I N AU GU RAL O RATIO N S , 1699-1707) (Giorgio A. Pinton & Arthur W . Shippee trans., Cornell Univ. Press 1993) (delivered
1707).
11

S TU D Y M ETH O DS , supra note 1, at 49.

12

Id. at 50-52.

13

Id. at 59.

14

Id. at 62.

15

Id. at 69.
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there is no external discourse to which it must answer through rhetorical argumentation. The
problem facing 18 th -century European society, he believes, is the need to bring legal doctrine
back into contact with eloquence and practical wisdom.16
One might wonder if Vico’s reference to law and legal education in the oration is
wholly happenstance, such that the musings of this eighteenth-century rhetorician have no
intrinsic connection to law. In fact, Vico was educated in law, sought a Chair on the law
faculty, wrote one of his early works on law, and rooted his thinking in legal reasoning and
eloquence. Donald Kelley’s reading of Vico leads him to suggest that the modern “social and
cultural sciences seem to be the ghosts of dead jurisprudences” 17 as capaciously understood
by Vico, and that it was jurisprudence as a “human system of moral, social, and political
thought . . . rather than the tradition of Greek, scholastic, or Cartesian metaphysics that
provided Vico with his principal model and central ideas.” 18 In a similar assessment,
Michael Mooney emphasizes that Vico’s conception of “rhetoric” was “not a literary but
judicial rhetoric – rhetoric as argumentation, a process of reasoning,” and that his New
Science was premised on the belief that the principles of argumentative discourse provide
access to the origin of humanity and undermine the intellectualist fantasy expressed by the
Cartesian critical method.19 Law is not just an example of one practice among many for
Vico. Law is the practice in which our civic life is born and renewed, and it is of central
importance to Vico’s philosophy.20
Vico’s oration speaks directly to the question that motivates my paper. A technocratic
approach to law and legal education suppresses the imagination and intellectual virtues
necessary to practice law in a manner that genuinely unites eloquence – which Vico defines
as “wisdom, ornately and copiously delivered in words appropriate to the common opinion

16

Id. at 69-70.

17

Donald R. Kelley, In Vico Veritas: The True Philosophy and the New Science, 43 S O C . R ES . 601, 611 (1976).

18

Donald R. Kelley, Vico’s Road: From Philology to Jurisprudence and Back, in G IAM BATTISTA V ICO ’S
S CIEN CE O F H U M AN ITY 15, 27 (Girogio Tagliacozzo & Donald Phillip Verene eds., 1976). Kelley concludes that the
“debts owed by Vico to jurisprudence are incalculable and in some cases almost indemonstrable . . . for they involve
matters not only of content but of form and method, not only exempla but, much more significantly, also principia of
human behavior.” Id. at 19.
19

M ICH AEL M O O N EY , V ICO

IN THE

T RAD ITIO N

OF

R H ETO RIC xiii, 82-83 (1985) [hereinafter T RA D ITIO N

OF

R H ETO RIC ].
20

For discussions of the centrality of law to Vico’s thinking, see generally S Y M PO SIU M : R ECALLING V ICO ’S
L A M EN T : T H E R O LE O F P RU D EN CE AN D R H ETO RIC IN L AW A ND L EGAL E D U CATIO N 83 C H I-K ENT L. R EV . 1097-1384
(2008).
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of mankind” 21 – with the re-fashioning of legal doctrine to address the case at hand. Legal
hermeneutics has supplanted rhetoric, but many contemporary theorists remain ignorant of
the rhetorical core of legal hermeneutics and so it devolves into a deductive-empirical
exercise of identifying the “original meaning” intended by the drafters or the “plain meaning”
of the legal text before the court. The law is now justice, but a methodological hermeneutics
that seeks certainty in the application of the law excises this dimension of law. As a result,
lawyers devolve into the mouthpieces of a voiceless wisdom that is equipped only to
manipulate legal formulae.
Vico’s “ingenious method” – studying topics and learning how to persuade others in
a situation of uncertainty – is a recommendation to use one’s common sense to imagine new
solutions to problems, to “see” a new path of persuasion by drawing connections that are not
already recognized. A well-chosen metaphor does just this, carrying meaning from one
situation to a new situation, seemingly instantaneously as if we suddenly see something that
previously had been hidden from view.22
The ingenious faculty assumes the important function of supplying arguments
which the rational process itself is not capable of “finding” . . . But it is
exclusively on the basis of revealing common elements that a transfer can be
made, and that is why Vico defines the ingenious faculty as a requisite for
metaphorical thought. . . . Based on the ingenious faculty, which establishes
relationships or common factors, imagination, according to Vico, confers
meanings on sense perceptions. Through its transfers, imagination is the
original faculty of “letting see” (phainestai), so that Vico calls it “the eye of
the ingenium.” 23
It is necessary to exercise the imagination through topical argumentation because there is no
substitute for the accumulation of experience. One cannot become prudent by deducing
answers to practical problems; one becomes prudent through the exercise of judgment based
on “insight,” which is really a “new sight,” or a “broader view.” To express this
metaphorically, consider how it is possible to improve one’s eyesight by using one’s eye in
a certain manner – as happens by the using a patch on one eye to force the other eye to focus
21

S TU D Y M ETH O DS , supra note 1, at 78.

22

The original meaning of “metaphor” was to physically carry an item from one place to another, but gradually
it came to be used “metaphorically” as a transfer of meaning that Aristotle recognized as being foundational to education
because it generated knowledge not through a chain of deductions that might fail but rather through immediate insight.
E RN ESTO G RASSI, R H ETO RIC AS P H ILO SO PH Y 94-95 (1980).
23

Ernesto Grassi, The Priority of Common Sense and the Imagination: Vico’s Philosophical Relevance Today,
43 S O C . R ES . 553, 562 (1976).
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properly – but we can be sure that reading about the biological structure of our optical
sensations will not improve this capacity. Vico urged us to recognize that we can improve
our ingenious capacity through proper education, the education in the liberal arts.24
Rhetorical education is a matter of gaining experience by exercising one’s rhetorical
capabilities, rather than a cognitive achievement.
Vico’s oration relates to law directly, but not superficially. Seen within the context
of his life’s work, the oration is premised on a view of knowledge and human understanding
that confronts the Cartesian critical approach at the deepest philosophical levels rather than
just suggesting that different educational methodologies should be employed. Vico’s
ingenious method – training students in the art of argumentation – develops the capacity of
their imagination to see the world in new ways. This is not just training students to learn
rhetorical tricks that can be mastered and then packed into the lawyer’s toolkit for later use.
Instead, Vico’s educational program was designed to facilitate the student’s ability to enter
and move about a semiotic realm by exercising their rhetorical competencies. Contemporary
lawyers are particularly in need of such an education because they must negotiate the
symbolic order of law through rhetorical engagement with others, a situation that became all
too apparent in twentieth-century America.
3.

Llewellyn’s Realist Account of the Rhetorical Dimension of Law

In the manner of Vico’s oration, Karl Llewellyn famously addressed the entering
students at Columbia Law School in the 1920s with a lecture meant to inspire as much as to

24

Michael Mooney makes this point vividly:
Ingenuity, Vico says repeatedly, is the “faculty of bringing together things that are disparate and
widely separated.” It lays no claim to thoroughness or method, but is a capacity, as Petrarch had said
of it, which is quick and decisive, penetrating and acute, ready and adaptive. One does not need to
call on ingenuity; one either has it or does not, see connections or misses them utterly. Vico was a
child of acute ingenuity, he claimed, and so, too, are children generally, if only we will recognize it
and train them accordingly. For ingenuity depends on the images of fantasy, a faculty most vivid and
robust in youth, and on the power of memory, fantasy’s twin, and they in turn take their start in
sensations, the images of sense. But the point is more subtle than it seems, for sense and memory are
not to be thought of as mere passive capacities, receiving and retaining impressions that imagination
and ingenuity subsequently work through; sense, memory, imagination, and ingenuity are four virtually
indistinguishable aspects of the single, prediscursive action of the mind.
....
Ingenious perception is truly an invention, an assembling and arranging of images that produces a
genuinely novel vision. . . . [In] oratory and law, it is a vision of how things should be, a course of
action that will set things right or avoid their deterioration, a vision that joins past to future through
current expectations, thus achieving plausibility, but one that does so through images that are familiar
and foreign alike, thus opening to us new ways. Such images are those of metaphor, language that is
sententious and acute.
M O O NEY , T RAD ITIO N O F R H ETO RIC , supra note 19, at 217, 225-27.
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orient. Llewellyn urged the students to immerse themselves in law not for the purpose of
losing themselves to a technical discipline but so as to recognize that law addresses the entire
“drama of society,” and to embrace the unity of profession, culture, and society.25 A short
time later, exactly two-hundred and twenty-five years after Vico’s address, Llewellyn
suggested – in what appears to be a throwaway footnote, exhibiting his customary florid
prose – that he is principally concerned with uncovering the rhetorical nature of legal
encounter with social drama.
I still feel my wattles grow red as I recall the shock with which, as a dyed-inthe-wool commercial lawyer, I met property phases of mortgage law which left
me gasping. “One system of precedent” we may have, but it works in forty
different ways. Some day, someone will help the second year student orient
himself. Nor does anyone bother to present to him the difference between
logic and persuasion, nor what a man facing old courts is to do with a new
vocabulary; in a word, the game, in framing an argument, of diagnosing the
peculiar presuppositions of the hearers. I think the second year student is
entitled to feel himself aggrieved. Meanwhile, while we wait upon the
treading of the Angel, there is rushing in that calls for doing. Here is a start.26
We can trace Llewellyn’s effort to develop an understanding of legal rhetoric principally
through his writings on legal education.
The following year, Llewellyn issued a testy call for a dramatic reorganization of legal
education in response to the insights generated by legal realism.27 Deriding the Langdellian
model because “it blinds, it stumbles, it conveyor-belts, it wastes, it mutilates, and it
empties,” 28 Llewellyn argued that legal education must prepare students to lead a full and
enriching professional life by educating them about the social context in which law operates
rather than just teaching abstract rules.29 Students must understand legal rules in context if
lawyering is to be something other than algebraic manipulations divorced from the real-world

25

K.N. L LEW ELLY N , B RAM BLE B U SH , 141-44, 152-53 (1930).

26

Karl N. Llewellyn, On Philosophy in American Law, 82 U. P A . L. R EV . 205, 205 n.* (1934).

27

K.N. Llewellyn, On What is Wrong with So-Called Legal Education, 35 C O LU M . L. R EV . 651 (1935)
[hereinafter, So-Called Legal Education].
28
Id. at 653. His conclusion is phrased in equally harsh terms: “Law school education, even in the best schools,
is, then, so inadequate, wasteful, blind and foul that it will take twenty years of unremitting effort to make it half-way
equal to its job.” Id. at 678.
29

Id. at 668-71.
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effects of the legal system, and it is precisely by understanding rules in context that we
recognize their contingency and develop a critical perspective. “You make critique
inevitable, because the human content, once introduced, will never be denied.” 30 Llewellyn
insisted that lawyers must have a liberal education if they are to bring such critical insight to
bear in legal practice. At the end of his career, Llewellyn still was calling for the study of
law as a liberal art, grounded in a combination of technical proficiency and broader
learning.31
The aim of Llewellyn’s “liberal education” is properly understood as rhetorical
competence. When he supplemented his Columbia orientation lectures twenty years later,
Llewellyn focused on the need to bridge the practice-theory divide. He emphasized that the
craft of law “cries out for the development and teaching of its theory, as it does also for study
by doing in the light of that theory.” 32 He named this needed approach “Spokesmanship,”
deriving it from the theories first developed in ancient Greece as “Rhetoric – in essence: the
effective techniques of persuasion.” 33 Too often, Llewellyn argued, Spokesmanship has been
cast too narrowly as the ability to add ornament to legal argument as part of advocacy.
But “Spokesmanship” has come to be for me a more significant focus than any
of the above, including and profiting from the essence of each of them while
also reaching out to cover such matters as the values of having buffers between
contending principals or the differences between the rival goals of victory and
30

Id. at 669.

31

K ARL N. L LEW ELLY N , The Study of Law as a Liberal Art, in J URISPRUD ENCE : R EALISM IN T H EO RY AN D
P RACTICE 375-94 (1962) (delivered in 1960) [hereinafter Liberal Art]. Llewellyn challenged the growing belief that
preparing students to practice law was inconsistent with the research ideals of the university:
The truth, the truth which cries out, is that the good work, the most effective work, of the lawyer in
practice roots in and depends on vision, range, depth, balance, and rich humanity – those thingswhich
it is the function, and frequently the fortune, of the liberal arts to introduce and indeed to induce. The
truth is therefore that the best practical training a University can give to any lawyer who is not by
choice or unendowment doomed to be hack or shyster – the best practical training, along with the best
human training, is the study of law, within the professional school itself, as a liberal art.
Id. at 376. Llewellyn also repeated his frequent insistence that law students read broadly and deeply to acquaint
themselves with the context in which law operates. Id. at 388-89.
32

L LEW ELLY N , B RAM BLE B U SH , supra note 25, at 185.

33

Id. Llewellyn explains:
There is a theory of advocacy, or spokesmanship, or rhetoric (which aspect lends the name is
immaterial) – a theory which has formed the basis of a liberal art since classic times; a theory,
moreover, which is empty and vain save as it builds on and with deep understanding of the
psychological and ethical nature of cause or of client, of tribunal or other addressee, of society and of
the law-governmental phase thereof.
Llewellyn, Liberal Art, supra note 31, at 382.
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reconciliation or the problems and obligations of leadership both in the small
and in the large. In a word, Spokesmanship with special attention to work on
the legal side seems to me to offer the wherewithal of a full-fledged
theoretical-practical discipline with cultural value equal to its professional
value.34
Spokesmanship is a rhetorical practice with both theoretical and practical dimensions that can
equip lawyers for the challenges of their profession.
Llewellyn’s conception of legal rhetoric was central to his realist philosophy, although
many critics badly misread him as an ivory-tower relativist who believed in law’s absolute
indeterminacy. In fact, Llewellyn found ample stability within the practice of law while at
the same time acknowledging room for critique and reform.35 Llewellyn wrote that the
totality of the practice of law was one of the most “conservative and inflexible” of social
phenomena, and yet every case offered the opportunity for the judge and lawyers to shift the
direction of thinking.36 Llewellyn anticipated the central tenet of contemporary legal
hermeneutics by arguing that the meaning of a legal rule is known only in its use, and that
using a rule always is a reformulation of the rule (either by expansion or contraction) even
when the case feels like a simple matter of deductive reasoning.
Thus, the task of the judge is to reformulate the rule so that from then on the
rule undoubtedly includes the case or undoubtedly excludes it. “To apply the
rule” is thus a misnomer; rather, one expands a rule or contracts it. One can
only “apply” a rule after first freely choosing either to include the instant case
within it or to exclude the case from it. . . .
Matters are no different, only more sharply highlighted, when a new
case is such that one first must mull over whether to include it within an
existing category, or must choose which existing category to include it in . . ..
For we all, lawyer not least, are mistaken about the nature of language.
We regard language as if words were things with fixed content. Precisely
because we apply to a new fact situation a well-known and familiar linguistic
symbol, we lose the feeling of newness about the case; it seems long familiar
34

L LEW ELLY N , B RAM BLE B U SH , supra note 25, at 186. This is his vision of a legal education in the tradition
of the liberal arts: attending to the rhetoric of lawyering in its broadest sense. Llewellyn, Liberal Art, supra note 29, at
389.
35

Dennis Patterson, Law’s Practice, 90 C O LU M . L. R EV . 575, 580-81, 598-99 (1990).

36

K ARL L LEW ELLY N , T H E C ASE L AW S Y STEM IN A M ERICA , 11-12 (Paul Gewirtz ed., Michael Ansaldi trans.)
(Univ. of Chicago Press, 1989) (originally published as Präjudizienrecht und Rechtsprechung in Amerika (1933), based
on lectures delivered in Germany in 1928-29).
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to us. The word hides its changed meaning from the speaker.37
His message was philosophically radical, but he was no linguistic skeptic, cultural nihilist or
political revolutionary. Llewellyn firmly believed that lawyers can and should be educated
to move within the rhetorically-rich narratives of law.
3.

Educating Lawyers with Ingenuity and Rhetorical Sensibility

Drawing from Vico’s oration and Llewellyn’s legal philosophy we can fashion a
productive lens through which to view the rhetorical dimensions of law and the resulting
implications for legal education. Vico wrote at a momentous time in the intellectual history
of the West, and he spoke with the conviction that his lessons were not effete academic
theories but instead concerned the possibility for the continued development of Western
culture. Scholars of his New Science 38 might debate whether Vico was a historical
determinist, but there can be no mistake that he believed firmly in the efficacy of human
agency at the time he delivered On the Study Methods of Our Time.39 Llewellyn also wrote
at a momentous intellectual moment, when the juridical forces of modernity had solidified

37

Id. at 74-75.
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G IAM BATTISTA V ICO , T H E N EW S CIENCE (Thomas G. Bergin and Max H. Fisch trans., Cornell Univ. Press
1968) (3 ed. 1744).
rd
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I concur with Mark Lilla that the New Science can be read as continuous with Vico’s earlier oration.
If civilized Athens and mighty Rome were both undone by the “barbarism of reflection,” is
there any hope of nations today escaping their fate? . . . In his pre-scientific works Vico’s practical
political teaching is clear enough: preserve the traditions and religious customs by which divine
providence directs you to the verum, forswearing the enticements of modern enlightenment, and you
shall be like Rome. But those earlier works treat only of Rome’s exemplary rise, ignoring her fall.
....
By studying the collapse of Rome at the end of her historical corso he now hopes to unmask
the forces that robbed her of those traditional strengths. Those lessons could then be applied to
European societies through the ricorso, which puts Europe in Rome’s place and reveals which of its
“Roman” traditions must be defended against the new barbarization.
On this reading, the corso-ricorso doctrine is not a scientific doctrine. It is a prophecy, a
dramatic warning to modern Europe that she stands at the edge of an abyss. No reader has come away
from the final packed pages of the New Science without sensing their prophetic rhetorical power. Just
as in On Method, where he once called modern Europeans to revive ancient education, Vico again
seems to be calling Europe away from its modernity.
....
His practical teaching is therefore relatively clear: societies wishing to maintain their
perfection must learn to strengthen all that is Roman within themselves, and direct all that is Greek
within them to serve these Roman virtues. Philosophy can retain a role in maintaining this
equilibrium, though only as the handmaiden of science and religion. Philosophy must now choose to
assist “common sense” rather than weaken it through skepticism.
M ARK L ILLA , G.B. V ICO : T H E M AKIN G O F AN A N TI-M OD ERN , 217, 225-27 (Harvard Univ. Press, 1993).
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an abstract and formal approach to jurisprudence, and the nascent tremors of postmodern
thinking had just begun. In periods of great intellectual crisis both thinkers displayed a sense
of pragmatic urgency, working from deep philosophical insight but remaining rooted in
practical questions of pedagogy.
Vico provides an ontology of legal rhetoric – an understanding of how lawyers see the
world and construct the world 40 – that simultaneously recognizes human agency and rejects
the hubristic claims of Enlightenment reason. Vico regards the creative insight of the rhetor
as an important factor in the ongoing elevation of man out of nature, but he does not endorse
a crude humanist account of subjective agency that assumes that individuals can rise above
their cultural context and survey it as a geographer might. He recognizes that we exist in and
through rhetorically-constructed narratives, and that there is no human subject capable of
willing meaning into being. Even while warning against the hubris of seeking knowledge
of things divine in an effort to become wholly self-directing, Vico insists that we are capable
of achieving knowledge of human affairs and shaping them. In short, Vico propounds a
rhetorical philosophy that is closely tied to civic and political engagement, and by returning
to Vico we find a starting point from which we may embark on a path that avoids the
Charybdis of “just playing” and the Scylla of endless self-consuming deconstruction.
Vico’s use of the metaphor of sight to describe rhetorical knowledge is an illuminating
trope for thinking about educating lawyers with rhetorical sensibility. The goal of legal
education should not be to instill knowledge of legal rules, or even to teach students how to
“think like a lawyer.” Rather, legal education should be a formative experience through
which students come to inhabit a new world in which they move about as one moves about
in a physical place. The ancient topics, loci communes, operated literally as “commonplaces” in which a community resided and within which members exhibited a “common
sense.” It is important not to misunderstand Vico’s metaphor by assuming that one’s senses
are passive receptors of abiding stimuli; to the contrary, seeing is an active engagement with
one’s surroundings, an evolving ability to move within commonplaces by exercising common
sense. There is no abiding truth to be seen, but rather arguments to be taken up by uniting
imagination with eloquence.
Vico argues that we can develop lawyering “sight” through the ingenious method of
rhetorical instruction. By arguing both sides of a case in response to a specific problem by
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I certainly do not propose to resuscitate Vico’s ontology as he conceived it, which was embedded within a
religious cosmology that no longer holds sway. See W illem W itteveen, “Reading Vico for the School of Law,” 83 ChiKent L. Rev. 1197, 1200 (2008). My reading is in the spirit suggested by W itteveen: “it is impossible to draw lessons
from the letter of the work; we should rather look for its spirit, manifesting itself at the level of metaphor . . . Literalism
in interpreting a classic text is often the best way of misrepresenting the views of its author.” Id. This is just to say that
I read Vico as a legal theorist rather than approaching him historically in an effort to capture his worldview.
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working within the commonplaces, students develop the capacity for the sophisticated
semiotic activities of lawyering. We should conceive legal education as educating students
about how to make arguments that can never meet the strictures of logical thinking, bringing
to bear Aristotle’s famous distinction between rhetoric and dialectic. For example, students
must learn to deploy metaphors in the course of legal argumentation in order to learn how
to find the available lines of argument for securing the adherence of their audience. A wellchosen metaphor leads the hearer to a conclusion directly, as if she suddenly turned her gaze
to see something for the first time. In fact, of course, the conclusion immediately in front of
her eyes is predicated on a complex body of tacit semiological knowledge and education that
the rhetor draws upon artfully, and cannot be generated reliably by methodical manipulation.
Through the practice of using metaphors in the course of a legal education, students begin
to see the world differently with an aim of being able to lead others to see the world
differently as well.
Vico’s teaching has gained new traction with the recent focus on research into the
metaphoric structure of cognition.41 Steven Winter has applied this research to the question
of legal reasoning and argumentation,42 arguing that it explains how legal reasoning can
simultaneously be creative and constrained.43 In a related vein, George Taylor extends Paul
Ricoeur’s detailed work on metaphors and suggests that it provides the means to address one
of the most important questions in legal theory: the role of creativity.44 The notion of
metaphor as way of being – a mode of creative existence within the world that in turn gives
us our world – literally “fleshes out” Vico’s insights into the cultivation of creative thinking.
These contemporary theorists reject the computational approach to reasoning and instead
locate reasoning in the primary metaphors that develop out of our corporeal existence and
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George Lakoff and Mark Johnson have combined to provide the most compelling combination of cognitive
studies and philosophy to describe this emerging field of study. See George Lakoff & Mark Johnson, Metaphors W e
Live By (Univ. of Chicago Press, 1980); George Lakoff & Mark Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind
and its Challenge to W estern Thought (Basic Books, 1999).
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Steven L. W inter, A Clearing in the Forest: Law, Life and Mind (Univ. of Chicago Press, 2001).
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W inter provides a succinct summary of this point in a recent article:
In short, what our examination of these legal metaphors shows is that legal imagination and
constraint are not opposed qualities they are thought to be, but a single human process. Metaphor, in
other words, reintegrates us with ourselves. An appreciation of metaphorical reason paradoxically
(and, from the perspective of W estern philosophy, “metaphorical thought” is already paradoxical)
reconiles freedom and constraint as mutually constitutive. Indeed, as Merleau-Ponty puts it, “without
roots which it thrusts into the world, it would not be freedom at all.”
Steven L. W inter, “Re-Embodying Law,” 58 Mercer L. Rev. 869, 897 (2007) [quoting Maurice Merleau-Ponty,
Phenomenology of Perception 456 (Colin Smith trans.) (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962)].
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George Taylor, “Law and Creativity,” in On Philosophy in American Law [xxx-xxx, forthcoming] (Francis
J. Mootz III ed., Cambridge Univ. Press, 2009).
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then, in turn, generate a complex and dynamic “body” of concepts that operate
metaphorically.45 These findings do not generate a methodology of creative thinking and
argumentation, but they do explain how this capacity develops and works. 46 Vico’s
suggested method of education – the cultivation of ingenuity through rhetorical
argumentation – finds strong support in this contemporary work.
If there can be no methodology of metaphorical reasoning and legal creativity, where
does Vico’s injunction lead us? First, it should be recalled that he does suggest an
“ingenuous method,” by which he means learning the topics and engaging in argumentation.
This is akin to conditioning one’s body for sports: we can deliberately fashion a plan to
sharpen our natural proclivities and skills so as to permit our body to perform in creative
ways in the heat of competition. In the context of legal education this same conditioning is

45

The philosopher, Mark Johnson, explains that the computational model of reasoning is being eclipsed by new
research that reveals how “our conceptualization and reasoning are grounded in our bodily experience and shaped
primarily by patterns of perception and action.” M ark L. Johnson, “Mind, M etaphor, Law,” 58 M ercer L. Rev. 845, 846
(2007). We reason according to “image schemas” that arise from our embodied interaction with the environment, and
therefore have “highly determinate ‘spatial’ or ‘bodily’ logics.” Once we have primary metaphors grounded in this
embodied logic,
we are off and running, so to speak. Through various types of blending and composition, we develop
vast coherent systems of metaphorically defined concepts. . . . All of our most impressive intellectual
achievements – in physics, chemistry, biology, anthropology, sociology, mathematics, logic,
philosophy, religion, and art – involve irreducible and indispensable conceptual metaphors. In other
words, all of the key concepts in all of these disciplines are defined by multiple, often inconsistent,
metaphors, and we reason using the internal logic of these metaphors.
Id. at 864-65. This basis for our thinking explains how we are at once grounded in the world and also capable of
creatively reshaping our world.
There is a logic of our bodily experience that is imaginatively appropriated in defining our abstract
concepts and reasoning with them. Imaginative processes of this sort depend on the nature of our
bodies, our brains, and the patterns of our interactions with our environment. Imagination – which is
the soul of human thinking – is therefore constrained and orderly, even though it can be flexible and
creative in response to novel situations.
Id. at 846.
46

During a roundtable discussion about the metaphoric basis of legal reasoning, Mark Johnson emphasized this

point:
. . . it is very popular to have what I call the miracle theory of creativity. It just happens, and there is
no explaining it. Some people just do this. But for the most part, what you are doing concerns
something that M ark Turner and Gilles Fauconnier have argued extensively in their book, The Way
We Think, which is about conceptual blending. They show you a number of different patterns by
which people routinely can create creative conceptual blends. And you do make use of these cognitive
resources that you have. I want to urge that it is not that you can predict when something creative can
come about, but it is an appropriation of something and seeing how it, or some certain sturctures, can
apply to some other domain.
That is not an explanation of how to be creative, but at least it suggests that it’s not a miracle.
It is not [that] this act is, like Richard Rorty would say, just a radical rupture.
Id. at 864-65.
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at work. The goal of legal education should not be to fashion a rigorous and computational
mindset but rather to lead students to exercise their creative thinking in ways that permits
them to begin practicing and accumulating the experience that further cultivates their
ingenuity. A law student who memorizes material and takes multiple choice tests is likely
to feel as if she is placed at the starting line of a marathon without having so much as jogged
around the block during the previous three years.
Additionally, we can rethink the project of legal education along the lines of
Llewellyn’s more concrete proposals. Llewellyn recognized the centrality of rhetoric to law,
and called for a liberal arts education in law to equip students with the training necessary to
practice law successfully. But Llewellyn also was a hard-nosed realist who understood the
institutional and historical realities of legal practice that could not be overcome by rhetorical
theories. “A liberal art can be as liberal as you please, and it should be – any liberal art
should be, including law. But one thing, I repeat, sits firm: any man who proposes to
practice a liberal art must be technically competent.” The lawyer must know more than
dexterity with Socratic dialogue: she must understand the world and how it works; she must
appreciate the depth and complexity of the problems facing individuals and entities that is
only later summarized in a few pages of the description of the “facts” in an appellate opinion;
she must appreciate that one of the “law-jobs” identified by Llewellyn is counseling one’s
client, and that this is different from serving as a legal mouthpiece; she must understand the
background social mores against which people invoke formal legal doctrine, appreciating the
meaning of a handshake or the filing of a lawsuit beyond their legally cognizable meaning;
and the list continues.
Llewellyn was ahead of his time in arguing that legal education should eschew a
wholly cognitive approach and instead embrace clinical education and post-graduate
apprenticeships. Even when diswcussing the education that occurs within the four walls of
the law school, he insisted on the need to develop more realistic teaching materials that
deepened the superficial world of the appellate opinion by adding context, background and
critical understanding. Legal education should break away from its exclusive focus on the
conceptual analysis of cases, Llewellyn believed, and address more broadly the skills
required of practicing lawyers.
He posits that the first goal of educational reform is to learn what lawyers actually do,
thereby revealing the capacities that should be developed in law school.47 Recognizing that
many lawyers play important roles in political and civic life leads Llewellyn to cast the
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Llewellyn, So-Called Legal Education, supra note 27, at 653-56.
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question broadly, asking “For Decent politics, what training do our law schools offer?” 48
Even those who devote their full professional life to practicing law do far more than apply
settled rules: “Not rules, but doing, is what we seek to train men for.” 49 After the first year
of Socratic dialogue about case law, Llewellyn urged that coursework should involve detailed
examinations of legal problems in their full complexity, even at the cost of not covering the
ever-expanding universe of legal doctrine. Class materials should bring together rich and
diverse materials for assessment and debate, guided by Llewellyn’s emphatic rule: “better
less, with real understanding, than more of the ununderstood . . . The upshot seems to be
that, within our [three year] time-limitation, we either integrate the background of social and
economic fact and policy, course by course, or fail of our job.” 50
As with Vico, contemporary scholars have rediscovered Llewellyn’s message and seek
to revive this thinking with a “new legal realism.” 51 The original realists had focused on a
realistic approach to appellate case law, showing that the deductive model described in law
school classrooms did not match with reality. Just as Llewellyn looked beyond caselaw,
scholars of new legal realism seek to prepare students for the complex social world they will
inhabit as legal professionals.52 These initiatives promise to revive Llewellyn’s insight into
48

Id. at 656.

49

Id. at 654.

50

Id. at 671. At the end of his career, Llewellyn was sounding the same theme:
To achieve the values of policy discussion in a modern context, the student needs enough information
about the particular rule under inquiry so that he can think instead of merely palaver or emote. Offthe-cuff, bald of information, is not policy-discussion, it is vaporing. . . . This inescapably results in
cutting, relentless cutting, of the doctrinal material covered. It means highly intensified treatment of
a vastly smaller body of rules. Cut down thus on scope of the material, and your class-hours do indeed
suffice to do the job of technical training, they suffice also to enrich it with exploration of meaning,
they suffice to go on into the arts of policy-evaluation, of imagining curative measures, and of
documentary and legislative drafting: all merging in the pursuit of a true liberal art.
Llewellyn, Liberal Art, supra note 31, at 385. As Llewellyn wryly reminds us, “I have never heard that Socrates was
seriously worried over ‘coverage in class.’” Id. at 387.
51

The “New Legal Realism” effort began with a conference at the University of W isconsin in 2004 dedicated
to extending the “law and society” thesis that legal studies should be grounded in empirical reality rather than just
conceptual rigor. Stewart Macaulay describes a two-pronged research agenda: describing “law in action” (how law really
works on the ground) and “living law” (social constraints in addition to legal prescription). Stewart Macaulay, “The New
Versus the Old Legal Realism: ‘Things Ain’t W hat They Used to Be’,” 2005 W isc. L. Rev. 365, 385-86.
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The Foreword to the W isconsin symposium provides a detailed description of the need to rethink legal
education as part of the new legal realism.

What, then, would a new legal realist approach to teaching look like? Ultimately
it implies a call for sociolegal scholars to take the everyday practice of law seriously, and
for legal education to take seriously the fact that lawyers need to be able to systematically
analyze the real world in which they operate. Legal doctrine as reflected in statutes and case
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the need for radical reforms of legal education.
The adherents of the new legal realism acknowledge that focusing on the “empirical
reality” of law and legal practice has the potential to devolve into a reductionist empiricism.53
This is where Llewellyn’s legacy can prove most helpful. Llewellyn’s realism called for the
rejection of conceptual abstraction and the recovery of “reality,” but he recognized that the
reality of legal practice is a web of interlocking discourses rather than a schema that could
be described and then mastered. He was far more pragmatic in outlook than many of his
fellow realists – who tended to place too much faith in the power of sociology, psychology
and economics – and he rejected the stereotypical realist view that law should be subsumed
into the social science departments of research universities.54
In short, he favoured a commonsense strategy for research, based on a realistic
appraisal of the obstacles in the way of quick advance, such as the cost, the
lack of glamour in much of the work, and the shortage of personnel with
appropriate training. . . . [His] was a pragmatic and sensible approach which

law is essential to lawyering and must be at the core of what is taught in law school. But,
in teaching these materials, there is a tendency to treat law as a closed, logical system;
students are often essentially taught – if only by implication – to set aside their
understanding of the real world as they learn to “think like a lawyer.”
A new legal realist approach to legal education would agree that the central focus
of legal education should be rigorous, analytic thinking, but would broaden what is included
in the substance of that analysis – not because it is interesting or ‘enriching,’ but because
it is core to the practice of law. It would merge theory and practice, teaching students to
think rigorously and systematically about the problems and situations they will encounter
in the practice of law. Traditional legal material is necessary but not sufficient for this
project. Decades of sociolegal scholarship have established that law is a social institution
that does not operate in a vacuum. Law is an open system, legal rules are not self-enforcing,
and informal processes often carry the day; thus, to practice law effectively, lawyers
combine their understanding of the law with their understanding of the real world.
. . . A new legal realist approach to legal education would take seriously the fact that
lawyers are continually engaged in what amount to mini research projects; they take in data
about the world around them, both experientially and from the reports of other people, and
process those data to come up with ideas about how things work and what consequences
flow from what actions.
Howard Erlanger, Bryant Garth, Jane Larson, Elizabeth Mertz, Victoria Nourse & David Wilkins, Foreword:
Is it Time for a New Legal Realism?, 2005 WISC . L. REV . 335, 359-60.
53
See Macaulay, supra note 51, at 395-96; Stewart Macaulay, “Contracts, New legal Realism, and Improving
the Navigation of The Yellow Submarine,” 80 Tulane L. Rev. 1161, 1189 (2006).
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Llewellyn, supra note 36, at 375-94; Michael Ansaldi, The German Llewellyn, 58 B RO O KLY N L. R EV . 705,
711 (1992).
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could form the basis for a rounded strategy for developing the subject, giving
due regard both to the importance of theory and to likely practical
difficulties.55
But simply accepting a chastened view of empirical studies is insufficient. Llewellyn had
made this point against some of his fellow realists, but he understood that deeper questions
were implicated and made a more far-reaching philosophical point.
Dennis Patterson suggests that the substance of Llewellyn’s philosophical views
anticipated Wittgenstein’s later work: Llewellyn firmly believed that philosophy leaves legal
practice as it is, but that nevertheless there is important work to be done within the practice.56
Like Wittgenstein, Llewellyn believed that we can never escape the realm of
linguistic understanding. What this means for the critique of law is that the
ground of critique must be internal to legal practice itself. The impossibility
of transcending the (linguistic) limits of the practice and reaching a point
outside the practice from which to critique it leaves only those within the
practice as sources – and evaluators – of criticism.57
It is precisely this philosophical disposition that brought Llewellyn to the rhetorical tradition
and aligns his work with the message of Vico’s oration. We must attend to the reality of law
and its social setting, and social scientific inquiry is a necessary part of this endeavor;
however, the “reality” of law can never be captured solely by empirical measurement any
more than by logical-deductive analysis.
4. Conclusion
The instrumental consciousness forged by contemporary legal practice will assert
itself with a vengeance against this article: “What is the solution?,” and even more urgently,
“What, exactly, is the problem?” “Legal education is designed to prepare students to be
lawyers, not philosophers or rhetoricians,” many might argue. This response demonstrates
the problem that this article seeks to engage.
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Legal education must expand its scope not because it answers an instrumental need,
but because such an expansion will undermine the instrumental ideology that pervades
contemporary legal practice. An expansion of scope in this respect means only to embrace
the full complexity of the practices that are reduced to caricatures of formal reasoning and
deductive logic that everyone recognizes hold no explanatory power or normative power.
Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s account of how we encounter the world generally rings especially
true for the experience of participating in legal practice. “The world is not what I think, but
what I live through. I am open to the world. I have no doubt that I am in communication
with it, but I do not possess it; it is inexhaustible.” 58 We cannot grasp legal reality and then
dispense it to students in carefully measured doses. Law is one modality of participating in
social reality, and that participation is complex and dynamic. Legal education should begin
to initiate students into this reality with a measure of self-understanding and self-criticism
rather than half-heartedly acknowledging the implausibility of the standard accounts of legal
reasoning but them reinscribing them every day in the classroom.
Ironically, by escaping from the narrow and artificial conception of legal education
fostered by an instrumental view of the law we will find that this new understanding better
serves students in their goal to be effective practitioners. Llewellyn’s call for legal education
as a liberal art is similar to an undergraduate liberal arts education: advocates tout it as being
intrinsically non-instrumental but then also claim that students are better prepared to deal
with the world in all its complexities – as a citizen, economic agent, and member of society
– as a result of their education. Vico’s rhetorical philosophy and Llewellyn’s rhetorical
conception of law and legal education point the way toward a re-orientation of legal
education and a re-conceptualization legal practice that revive elements of ancient wisdom
while also boldly addressing the needs of contemporary society. By following this path, legal
education can avoid failing its students.
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